

Поисковые теории рынков (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2010 года)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-1-51-64
Аннотация
В работе дан обзор поискового подхода к анализу рынков, разработанного лауреатами Нобелевской премии по экономике 2010 г. - Питером Даймондом, Дейлом Мортенсеном и Кристофером Писсаридесом. Основное внимание уделяется применению поискового подхода к анализу рынков труда. В статье раскрывается недостаточность вальрасовского подхода к анализу рынков. Приведен пример упрощенной базовой поисковой модели рынка труда, а также кратко описывается вклад каждого из лауреатов.
Об авторах
М. НикитинРоссия
кандидат экономических наук, Ph.D., профессор Международного института экономики и финансов НИУ ВШЭ
А. Юрко
Россия
Ph. D., доцент
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Никитин М., Юрко А. Поисковые теории рынков (Нобелевская премия по экономике 2010 года). Вопросы экономики. 2011;(1):51-64. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-1-51-64
For citation:
Nikitin M., Yurko A. Search Theories of Markets (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2010). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2011;(1):51-64. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-1-51-64