

Реформы российского образования и экономическая теория
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-4-19
Аннотация
В статье сопоставляются основные направления изменений в экономическом механизме среднего образования в России, некоторые положения современной экономической теории, а также результаты анализа зарубежных реформ, нацеленных на усиление конкуренции между школами. Показано, что ожидания повышения качества отечественного среднего образования, связанные с изменениями в экономическом механизме, являются во многом ошибочными: и положения теории, и зарубежный опыт свидетельствуют о существовании серьезных рисков снижения качества образования как следствии усиления конкуренции между школами.
Об авторе
В. ТамбовцевРоссия
доктор экономических наук, профессор экономического факультета
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Рецензия
Для цитирования:
Тамбовцев В. Реформы российского образования и экономическая теория. Вопросы экономики. 2005;(3):4-19. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-4-19
For citation:
Tambovtsev V. Economics and Reforms of Russia’s Education. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2005;(3):4-19. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-4-19