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Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Applications (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2012)
https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-1-4-26
Abstract
The paper provides an overview of major results in the theory of two-sided markets that brought the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in economics to Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth. We describe the celebrated Gale & Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm and Shapley & Scarf top trading cycles algorithm in applications to marriage and college admissions markets, and provide simple examples to illustrate the basic mechanics of these algorithms. We also explain how Gale & Shapley algorithm can be used to improve efficiency of college admission in Russia.
About the Authors
E. Zhelesova
Schneider Electric (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
S. Izmalkov
New Economic School (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
K. Sonin
New Economic School (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
I. Khovanskaya
National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia)
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Zhelesova E., Izmalkov S., Sonin K., Khovanskaya I. Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Applications (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2012). Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2013;(1):4-26. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2013-1-4-26
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