The article aims to estimate a short-term neutral real interest rate (NRI) in Russia after transition to inflation targeting. The article provides a review of theoretical factors, which demonstrates the difference between short-term and long-term neutral real interest rate. The following analysis of estimates of NRI in different countries shows that its decline in developed and developing countries is due to various factors. Further, the article provides a comparative analysis of advantages and disadvantages of three main approaches to NRI estimation: using financial market indicators, statistical methods and multilevel theoretical models. Based on multivariate unobserved components model (UCM) for the Russian economy, the article concludes that the short-term NRI decreased from 5 to 1% in 2016—2020, whereas monetary policy was predominantly neutral.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the reaction of different consumer groups to the bank credit supply shocks. As parameters of consumer heterogeneity, we consider differences (i) in the form of home ownership (households with and without mortgages and tenants) and (ii) in the form of credit (households with large debt (mortgages, car loans), households with small (consumer) credit and without loans). For empirical analysis we use RLMS-HSE longitudinal Household Panel Survey for the period from 2006 to 2019, which covers two episodes of the credit crisis and post-crisis recovery. Bank credit supply shocks are estimated using the standard structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, which also identifies aggregate supply and demand shocks and monetary policy shocks. Our results show that with a positive credit supply shock, which is equivalent to a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the interest rate on loans, households with mortgages increase their consumption by 2.1—2.5% more than households without mortgages. The observed effect is significant, since the average annual growth rate of consumption of households with mortgages in our sample is 3.8%. Our results indicate that the Bank of Russia’s macroprudential policy, which uses countercyclical capital buffers (Basel III) as a tool, can be very effective in smoothing the consumption of households with mortgage debt.

The article analyzes the factors of deviation of regional rates of price growth from the national average and estimates the structural levels of inflation in Russian regions, which can be achieved if the Bank of Russia maintains inflation at 4%. The assessment of the structural levels of regional inflation was carried out using groupings of regions according to the degree of labor mobility, transport accessibility, sectoral specifics of the economy, the share of social transfers in the population’s income, and the region’s affiliation with the federal district. The greatest significance was shown by such factors of heterogeneity of regional inflation as the volume of lending to individuals, the level of price rigidity, inflationary expectations and the nominal effective exchange rate of the ruble. In addition, for each Russian region, an assessment of labor mobility was given through the Okun coefficient. It is concluded that the Balassa—Samuelson effect in the long-term period is a significant factor in inflation heterogeneity only in regions with high labor mobility. The results of assessing the structural levels of regional inflation can be taken into account in the development of monetary policy and in the implementation of the information policy of the Bank of Russia.

Most of research on institutional transplantation is based on a set of general methodological principles and theoretical positions, which in total might be termed the “classical theory”. Despite its persuasiveness and wide currency (including outside the economic discourse), the classical theory of institutional transplantation has many built-in methodological limitations. It has a pronouncedly one-sided character, is based on reductionist approaches, and has problems with a systemic explanation of transplant processes in the modern economy. The article presents an interdisciplinary research program for the extended theory of institutional transplantation. The extended theory proposes to pay special attention to bottomup transplants, as well as the role of institution-based communities — heterogeneous networks of internal and external actors of transplanted institutions. Adaptation of a transplanted institution to the new environment is viewed more as an active transformation of the environment by actors (institutional niche construction). The deviations from foreign prototypes arising in transplanted institutions are interpreted as adaptive refunctionalizations rather than transplant failures. Special emphasis is placed on the interactive communication field in which transplanted institutions develop. As a result of transplantation, it is proposed to consider not the dichotomy of successful adaptation and rejection of a new institution, but the emergence of institutional assemblage — a complex system of borrowed and local institutions based on irreducible institutional logics. 

The paper applies a typology of agency models of corruption, based on the conformity of principal and agent’s preferences to the “ideal” preferences of society. The proposed approach has allowed to theoretically substantiate the existence of new models of corrupt behavior, quasi- and totalitarian corruption, and subsequently to reveal cases of such agents’ behavior in the public procurement practice. In conditions of inefficient regulation, developed by the mala fide principal, bona fide agents in an effort to best meet the needs of society may violate certain provisions of regulatory legal acts or regulatory policy principles (quasi-corruption) whilst the mala fide agents do the same things for bribes (efficient corruption). On the other hand, in some cases the agents have to act in accordance with the inefficient regulation, being deprived of the possibility to violate it (totalitarian corruption). In the paper, the discussion of assumptions of different models, presented in the typology, including quasi- and totalitarian corruption, has been found in the academic literature. The paper examines the hypothesis that the proposition of Russian single-source procurement regulation which directly restricts annual small purchasing of contracting authorities provokes totalitarian corrupt behavior of buyers making them use electronic reverse auctions instead of single-source procurement to award small contracts.

In the development of economic theory, since the 15th century, mercantilism was replaced by classical theory, and neo-mercantilism was replaced by neoclassical theory. The modern form of mercantilism is called by English- speaking researchers as a new neomercantilism. The paper analyzes the reasons for the change in economic policy in modern Anglo-Saxon countries, when the process of globalization was replaced by economic nationalism with trade wars, barrier duties, and ruptures of international agreements. This transformation was most evident after the announcement of the results of the English Brexit vote and the American vote in the 2016 presidential election. It is concluded that the attempt to change the dominant economic paradigm in the U.S. under President D. Trump looks quite natural and poses a real threat to the established world economic order.

Cryptocurrency as an economic narrative, on the one hand, is innovative and interesting for the information society, since it fully meets the requirements of the digitalization period, but, on the other hand, its revolutionary nature is puzzling for regulatory authorities due to the need for a full-scale restructuring of the established economic order. Popularizing the unregulated social phenomenon “cryptocurrency” requires an immediate response from government authorities. According to these trends, authors explore institutional changes in connection with the upcoming introduction of the digital ruble and develop recommendations for legitimizing the national currency in digital form. The authors conclude that the actions taken by the mega-regulator and authorities are not focused on creating a digital economy by organizing a shared digital space, the implementation of which is possible only on a common unified multifunctional digital platform, but on preserving traditional infrastructure.