The paper contains a retrospective analysis of macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic reforms in the post-Soviet countries in 1992—2021, that is, after obtaining political and economic independence at the end of 1991. Special attention is paid to the problems of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. As a result of structural distortions inherited from the Soviet economy and slow pace of economic and institutional reforms, the countries of the former Soviet Union suffered from the long and deep output decline in the 1990s, and their post-transition growth recovery in the 2000s did not last long. Furthermore, they remain vulnerable to both domestic and external economic shocks. Given a limited predictability of post-COVID global economic trends, this vulnerability will continue, most likely, in the next couple of years.

The paper analyzes the main changes in the Russian labor market during the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In previous crisis episodes, the Russian labor market reacted to downturns in a non-standard way — not so much by employment decline and unemployment surge as by wage cuts and reduction in working hours. The discussion focuses on the question whether this algorithm has been preserved under conditions of the corona crisis. The empirical basis is provided by microdata from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS—HSE) for 2020. The paper describes the main mechanisms of labor market adjustment (wage cuts, part-time transfers, involuntary furloughs, telecommuting and others), analyzes the scale and dynamics of their use, assesses their differentiation by sociodemographic groups and types of enterprises. For each form of crisis adjustment both descriptive and econometric analysis is carried out. The Russian experience is compared with reaction to the corona crisis by other labor markets. It is shown that, like other countries, Russia managed to avoid a collapse of employment and explosive growth in unemployment mainly due to active utilization of two key instruments — various types of part-time employment and telecommuting. This allows us to conclude that the specific “Russian” labor market model has once again confirmed its ability to effectively accommodate even the strongest economic shocks.

The paper discusses two major dimensions of labor market adjustment to crisis conditions in Russia in 2020. Price adjustment manifests itself through changes in wages, and quantitative adjustment — in hiring and separations. Most general conclusion is that, in 2020, the former dominated, while the latter also took place. Our analysis shows deep but very selective and short run fall in wages. Exposure to downward wage flexibility was a function of type of economic activity and type of residence, not of demographic characteristics or education. Freezing new hires became the main instrument for quantitative adjustment, though the intensity of separations decreased as well. Reduction in both components of labor turnover means slower workers’ reallocation and preservation of the old economic structure. If during the previous crises legislative and administrative measures slowed down reductions in personnel, which could be beneficial for employers, in the covid case employers seek to preserve the matching capital needed for fast and efficient recovery and growth.

Drivers and factors of social service outsourcing to non-profits are identified and discussed. A key point of the discussion of the choice between for-profits and non-profits as outsourcing partners is whether the quality of the service is observable and verifiable by third parties. In the case of unobservable/ unverifiable quality, market incentives could be misaligned with social welfare, and non-profits gain an advantage over for-profits. Cross-country analysis reveals factors explaining variations in non-profit outsourcing. All else equal, more outsourcing is observed among nations with efficient public sector governance and strong civil society. A theory is presented to compare cost, quality and social welfare between contracting-out to for-profits and non-profits. Theory findings and predictions are illustrated by the case of outsourcing of long-term care to for-profits and non-profits, using recent evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Do subsidies drive productivity at the farm-level? To address this question, we use farm-level data from the Amur region in Russia for 2010—2014. Using this data, we assess corporate farm production function and find no economically or statistically significant cumulative effect of state subsidies on total factor productivity within three years after the subsides were received. Our findings are robust to the choice of the production functional form, time period, and land measures. So one might conclude that subsidies to corporate farms in Amur Oblast serve primarily as a tool of income support not as a driver of the productivity change. Our research contributes to the discussion about the effects of state supports and subsidies on agricultural development, productivity, and market structure in Russia.

The paper explains why, despite the publication of the original edition of the book in 2005, Eggertsson’s work is still relevant and why it should be studied not only by experts in institutional economics. The provisions of the research results on imperfect institutions are discussed, including the discussions of the institutional transformation of the Russian economy at the end of the 20th century. The issues of the relationship between social and production technologies, path dependency, social mental models and institutional changes are revealed, with an emphasis on the problems of the consequences of mass privatization in Russia, and on the transplantation of institutions following the ideas on the institutional structure of society.