The article deals with social and economic trends of the global and Russian economies under current pandemic challenges. The key characteristics of 2021 were the recovery economic growth along with a corresponding increase in employment, the shift to global inflation, a growing role of the state in economic development, accelerated digitalization of social and economic life, the climate change agenda. Special attention is paid to Russian economic trends and economic policy of the government, short- and long-term challenges, as well as forthcoming risks of economic performance.

By the fall of 2021, the Russian economy had practically overcome the crisis caused by coronavirus pandemic and sharp drop in oil prices in the first half of 2020, having returned in terms of GDP, industrial production and investment in fixed assets to pre-crisis levels. At the same time, the prospects for further growth of the Russian economy remain uncertain, since both in the short and long term, the balance of factors affecting the growth rate of Russia’s GDP is shifted to a negative area. These external factors include the growing risks of a new financial and/or economic crisis in the world’s leading economies (including China), imposing large-scale sanctions against Russia in connection with a special operation in Ukraine, the instability of world commodity markets, as well as the processes of decarbonization and restructuring of the world economy. Internal factors of growth comprise increased investment activity of private and state-owned companies (and in the field of national projects), expansion of non-resource non-energy exports, while internal growth constraints comprise possible decline in the working-age population in Russia and slow growth of the real personal income. According to the official forecast by the RF Ministry of Economic Development, after the recovery acceleration of the economy by 4.2% in 2021 (the first estimate by Rosstat — 4.7%), GDP growth will stabilize at about 3% per year in subsequent years. However, it is lower than expected growth rates of the world economy, but it is significantly higher than the average growth rates of the Russian economy over the past decade (about 0.7% per year).

To reveal the growth rates structure, which corresponds to anticipated economic dynamics in Russia, we have used an approach based on identifying three components of GDP growth rates — structural, foreign trade, and business cycle ones. In this article a new decomposition method was applied, which assumes the neutrality of the foreign trade component if the oil price is at the average long-term values.

In case of achievement of the RF Ministry of Economic Development forecast, actual and structural unemployment indicators convergence may lead to a shortage of labor in certain sectors of the Russian economy in 2022—2023. The solution to this problem lies in the sphere of external and internal migration policy intensification and measures for promoting inter-sectoral labor mobility. Estimates of the output gap show that it is advisable to pursue a stimulating fiscal policy in 2022 with a transition to neutrality in 2023—2024. Supporting the global spread of vaccines against coronavirus infection and the recovery of the global economy will contribute to an increase in oil prices and in the foreign trade component of economic growth in Russia.

Over the past thirty years, the company and its environment have been the subject of lively academic discussion by several major global schools: the study of national innovation systems, and of the emergence, development and diffusion of innovation; research that analyzes value chains; institutional theory; ecosystem approach; strategic management; forecasting; planning; and foresight to assess current corporate processes and future transformations. The research landscape is still highly fragmented and characterized by several extensive gaps related to an integrated approach to the study of the company, taking into account the global trends, incentives and patterns of behavior of the key stakeholders. The paper presents the results of the research uniting different theoretical approaches on the platform of foresight: a two-loop integral ecosystem model is proposed which takes into account the influence of global trends on internal and external stakeholders of a company, including the empirical survey of more than 260 Russian companies in 2021. A set of practical recommendations for using modern foresight instruments to form, manage and transform the company ecosystem is given. A forecast of possible directions of development is made.

The article is devoted to the empirical identification and analysis of the stylized life cycle of high-growth companies (gazelle firms, HGFs). The stylized cycle is calculated in real time by summarizing the dynamics of the main indicators of 11 generations of HGFs (7743 firms). On the basis of this analysis, the effects not previously described were established. (1) The presence of a trigger point at which a change in the business model causes a catastrophic deterioration in the main indicators, but at the same time opens the way to rapid growth in a new direction (the phenomenon of internal creative destruction). (2) Outstripping growth in profitability compared to revenue in the midst of a phase of rapid growth of HGFs. This fact explains the mechanism of self-financing of the rapid growth stage in the conditions of well-known discrimination of HGFs by external investors. (3) Preservation of increased investment activity of gazelles after the end of the stage of rapid growth. The high level of investment shows that ex-HGFs are making real efforts to resume growth and, therefore, have the potential as objects of state support.

In this paper, the consumption profiles of households in the Russian Federation are constructed and, on their basis, the parameters of future discounting and relative risk aversion are evaluated. The paper demonstrates that the age profiles are hump-shaped, the peak consumption level is reached at 38—40 years. The important determinant of the hump shape is the composition of the household: when consumption is recalculated for the average individual in a household, the hump shape becomes less pronounced. On average, households have a high level of relative risk aversion and a low level of future discounting. This configuration of parameters indicates the important role of the precautionary motive in the consumer behavior of households. Estimates are presented for households with different levels of education and number of people.

This study examines the impact of food counter‑sanctions introduced in 2014 and the accompanying shock price hike on consumer spending in Russian households. Moscow residents were studied separately as being mostly inclined to consume imported products, for whom the real total gap with potential consumer spending was estimated at 4,600 rub. per month per family, which is 2,2 times higher than the same indicator for the regions. Importantly, for the residents of Moscow the most deviating from the scenario trajectory was the cost of dairy products, while for the residents of the regions meat products were mostly deviating. In terms of the type of settlement in which the household lives, the real effect for urban dwellers was more than 3 times higher than for rural dwellers. While for the residents of cities significant parts of the losses are those in the market for fruits and vegetables, for rural residents this market was protected from negative consequences.

The review examines the main ideas of the book by the British economist Amos Witztum “The betrayal of liberal economics”. The main aspect of betrayal, which the author reveals, is manifested in the rejection of modern economic theory from the liberal basis of its classical predecessor, which assumed the social conditionality of individual actions in the economy. With the help of the achievements of anthropology and comparative neuroscience, in particular, relying on the hypothesis of the “social brain”, the author formulates a thesis about the human intrinsic sociality. Based on it, the author characterizes the behavior model focused on the significance of relationships — as opposed to market signals, as “expressive” rationality, and at the same time, the impossibility of reducing it to economic instrumental rationality — due to the opportunistic nature of the latter. Thus, the author exposes the unjustifiability of “faith” in market competition as an effective mechanism for allocating resources and an acceptable social guideline, recommending economists to fight for its containment instead of propaganda, using the classical conceptual framework developed by A. Smith and J. S. Mill.

The form of organization and performance of both the entire supply chain and the markets at its individual links are determined by the structure and mechanisms of vertical interaction of its participants. Most existing approaches to explaining such forms emphasize the differences between hierarchy, market and hybrid contracting. This study specifies the forms of vertical interaction in supply chains and determines the factors of their choice. Supply chain integration on a par with vertical restrictive agreements is proposed to be considered as a form of hybrid contracting. On the basis of the theory of the firm the question of the choice of the form of vertical interaction is considered. It is shown that supply chain integration leads to a fundamental transformation of market multilateral relations into bilateral supply contracts and to the formation of transactional-specific assets which ensure the sustainability of this form of vertical interaction. As a result, compared to market interactions, there is a decrease in transaction costs while control costs increase, so supply chain integration occupies an intermediate place between the market and vertical restrictive agreements.