The paper examines long-term trends in the evolution of the Russian labor market, as well as its short-term adjustments to negative economic shocks. The analysis covers a wide array of indicators, both quantitative and price ones. The results obtained show that the Russian labor market is in a process of restructuring. Labor force and employment are on long-term downward trends, unemployment has fallen to a record low, after a long period of stagnation, labor turnover has sharply intensified, and vacancies have reached an all-time high. At the same time, its algorithm of responding to negative shocks remained virtually unchanged. As before, short-term adjustments are brought about mainly through decline in wages and contraction of working hours, rather than through decrease in employment and increase in unemployment (“the Russian labor market model”).

The paper investigates the relationship between market power of employers and level of employees’ wages in local labor markets in Russia. The study is based on the modern concept of local labor markets, which assumes that the latter have not only geographical (spatial), but also sectoral (professional) boundaries. Using data from the web portal of Rostrud “Rabota Rossii” (Jobs of Russia) about 13.2 million vacancies posted in the period 2018Q1—2022Q3, for the first time in Russian practice concentration indicators were calculated for 30 thousand local labor markets in Russia, determined by a pair of properties “settlement— profession”. It is shown that 20% of local labor markets of mass professions in Russia are characterized by at least a temporary state of monopsony. Using the methods of economic-mathematical (econometric) modeling, it is demonstrated that the growth of the market power of employers is statistically significantly associated with a decrease in the wages of workers in mass professions. According to the estimates obtained, when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution of market power, the level of nominal wages offered to employees in local labor markets, other things being equal, decreases by 6.3—8.4%. The result is robust to the use of alternative approaches to defining the boundaries of local labor markets in Russia.

The choice of a workplace, in the public or private sector, is not accidental. The paper presents a study on the public—private intersectoral gap in job satisfaction (JS). Given the observed wage premium in the private sector, it can be assumed that there are non-monetary forms of compensation for the wage loss in the public sector. They are expected to manifest themselves in job safety during periods of recession, which might affect the intersectoral gap in job satisfaction. Evaluation on panel data with fixed individual effects allows solving the problem of self-selection into a certain sector. A study based on RLMS-HSE data shows that in the period 2002—2021 the intersectoral gap in job satisfaction, as well as its elements — satisfaction with the labour contract, salary and promotion, — was generally insignificant. This does not rule out self-selection into a particular sector but explains the low level of transitions between the sectors. A significant intersectoral gap in job satisfaction is revealed for less competitive groups in the labor market during crises. This is the evidence of negative self-selection. During the COVID-19 pandemic, women, young workers (17—34 years old), and at other times, workers over 55 years old employed in the public sector rated JS significantly higher. Negative self-selection into the public sector is more likely to be attributed to specific socio-demographic groups than to the entire sector. Wage, as well as its degree in comparison to the average one in the profession in the local labor market, affects the JS of public employees to a lesser extent. This suggests that public workers are less sensitive to monetary rewards and value job safety, self-realization opportunities and a sense of usefulness of work for society more.

This paper for the first time estimates the scale of subsidizing the Russian population through low prices for the energy sector products (1.76 trillion rubles, or 1.3% of Russian GDP in 2021). The need to reform the existing subsidy system is justified due to a number of its defects (appropriation of most of the subsidies by the wealthiest population, significant costs of business to maintain low prices for energy products, reduction of incentives for energy saving and transition to green technologies among consumers of the energy sector products). The phenomenon of an implicit “social contract”, in which the state maintains prices for socially important goods and services at a level acceptable for the population in exchange for the loyalty of citizens, is discussed in detail. The paper analyzes alternative options for reforming energy subsidies for the population. The conclusion is made that the most reasonable reform would be one providing for zeroing of subsidies with the use of part of the released budget resources to increase socially oriented government spending (targeted social payments are considered to be the basiс form of such spending). The proposed subsidy reform scheme is interpreted as a change in the social contract model that is acceptable to the public, namely, a shift from the “low prices of socially important goods — low socially important state expenditure” model to the “high prices of socially important goods — high socially important state expenditure” model.

The current study aims to evaluate losses in the efficiency for Russian firms from the departure of foreign vendors based on data covering the activity of 6 thousand companies over 15 years (2007—2021). Modeling within the production function approach revealed that Russian firms, on average, are approximately equally dependent on domestic and foreign digital products, that indicates a moderate level of risk. At the same time, the influence is very heterogeneous. Foreign products have a non-linear (decreasing) effect, while Russian products have a linear impact. The returns to IT and the risk of loss in the efficiency vary greatly over time and across industries. Summarizing different results, we assume that the Russian economy could maintain efficiency in the short term; however, the departure of foreign vendors creates significant threats to its long-term development.

This paper is based on data of the Household Finance Survey carried out from 2013 to 2020. The analysis shows that household income growth was less affected by the pandemic than by the economic downturn in 2015. Consumer lending continued to expand in 2020, with a rising percentage of lower income borrowers. The increase in the share of highly indebted households and the overall growth of debt burden were moderate in 2020. An outstanding consumer loan did not have a significant negative effect on the self-assessment of a respondent’s financial situation on average. This negative effect was statistically significant among families with children and borrowers from vulnerable categories of workers.

The article presents the analysis of Russia’s potential to transition to a new technological order. The potential assessment was carried out on the basis of the obtained level of manufacturability in the Cobb—Douglas production function as an indicator reflecting long-term technological trends, the available resource potential, the efficiency of its use and the country’s ability to transition to a new technological order. The conducted research has shown that since 2014, the country has been undergoing a restructuring of the level of technology, caused by a decrease in the return on capital against the background of a stretched process of innovation in the economy. One of the limitations hindering the successful transition to a new technological order is regional differentiation in the level of technology, which can be explained by the excessive accumulation of old technologies and the discrepancy in the skill level of the workforce, as well as significant differences in the level of knowledge and skills among regions.